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Aliya Haider*
This article is about an amicus brief written by a group of lawyers at a law
firm in New York on behalf of the scientific community in Roper v. Simmons. On
behalf of our clients, we argued that the death penalty's goals of retribution and
deterrence were not served by its application to juveniles. Because recent
scientific advances in brain research indicate that the adolescent brain has not yet
fully developed, the decision-making capacity and risk-taking behavior of
adolescents are far different from those of adults; thus adolescent offenders are
less culpable. These scientific findings were central to the oral argument.
Moreover, this article notes that Justice Kennedy's opinion overturning the
juvenile death penalty relied on the amicus briefs research and conclusions to
support his rationale for deeming the juvenile death penalty cruel and unusual
punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted."' In determining just what is cruel and unusual, the
Court has looked to evolving standards of decency. 2 What those standards are-
and who articulates then--has been a source of contention for the Court.
Nevertheless, it is clear that state legislative enactments are critical to assessing
whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual. Thus, much of the debate
has focused on whom the state chooses to execute rather than the method of
execution itself.
The law makes clear that there are two bases on which to justify the
imposition of the death penalty: retribution and deterrence. Retribution is usually
discussed by the Court in arguments that emphasize fairness. The notion of
culpability lies at the heart of the logic of retribution. Further, the punishment
meted out should be proportional to the blameworthiness, or culpability of the
offender. Deterrence is discussed in terms that emphasize the efficient
administration of justice and ordering of society.
* Aliya Haider received her J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2003, her M.Sc. from the
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U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
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This article discusses an amicus brief 4 in Roper v. Simmons,5 written on behalf
of the scientific community6 by a group of lawyers at a law firm in New York. To
summarize, we relied on emerging scientific data for support to argue that the
adolescent brain is not fully formed, and consequently, adolescent decision-making
capacity and risk-taking behavior is far different than that of an adult. We did have
a political position regarding the juvenile death penalty-we were against it. It
would be disingenuous to disclaim our point of view, but then who is without one?
We harnessed the available research to the existing law and argued that the death
penalty's goals of retribution and deterrence were not served by its application to
juveniles. Thus, the science brief was born.
II. APPROACH: MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The legal team writing the brief was keenly aware that there is a balance
between advocacy and neutrality. While we had a legal position to advocate, we
represented scientific institutions, and it was of the utmost importance to honestly
represent the conclusions the scientific evidence actually supported. In short, we
did not push the science beyond its limits.
The process of assessing the scientific research and determining which studies
were more respected than others was a thorough one. Primarily, we had an
"advisory panel," a group of four or five scientists at various research universities
who were well-versed in the field of brain development research, including some
who had a particular focus on adolescents. We asked this panel to direct us to the
foundational and well-settled research in the field, as well as to emerging research.
The advisory panel was, in many ways, our compass. We interacted with
each advisor independently-this allowed a vetting process for their respective
comments and provided invaluable refinement of sources. Once we compiled the
relevant research, each member of the group reviewed it, looking for omissions or
misuses. This process took about four to six months and we continued to ensure
our research was current right up until our filing date.7
We had other sources of input as well. The assistance of scientists working at
our client-institutions (the American Medical Association and the American
Psychiatric Association among them) was helpful--especially given the stature of
these organizations. Some of the attorneys working on the case had science
4 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at 2004 WL 1633549 [hereinafter Brief of
the American Medical Ass'n].
5 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6 Our amici of record includes the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric
Association, the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, the National Association
of Social Workers, and the National Mental Health Association.
7 July 16, 2004.
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backgrounds, while other attorneys spent countless hours reading about
neuroscience and learning about the fundamentals of the human brain. In these
and other ways, we became facile with the scientific research so we could
demonstrate how it impacted the law.
The legal team working on the science brief believed that the Court was
receptive to abrogating the application of the death penalty, if it could be shown
that executing a certain class of offenders would not serve the twin goals of
retribution and deterrence. Before Roper, the Court had imposed some limits on
the application of the death penalty. In 1988, a plurality of the Court in Thompson
v. Oklahoma held that it was cruel and unusual to execute a person who was under
sixteen at the time of his crime.8 In 1989, however, the Court rebuffed an attempt
to extend Thompson to those who were sixteen and seventeen at the time they
committed their offenses.9 In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court thus upheld the
constitutionality of state statutes authorizing the execution of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders.10 In the same year the Court decided Stanford, the
Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh that it was constitutional to execute the mentally
retarded." But in 2002, the Court reversed Penry, and held in Atkins v. Virginia
that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute mentally retarded offenders.'
2
The Court noted that retribution and deterrence were not served by executing the
mentally retarded. 13
]JI. RETRIBUTION
The science brief argued that retribution would not be served by executing
adolescents.' 4  In death penalty jurisprudence, culpability is the measure of
retribution. 5  The Court is committed to meting out punishments that are
proportionate to the offender's culpability. Thus, in our science brief, we argued
that juveniles' brains are anatomically different and deficient as compared to those
of adults.
While moral culpability could not be measured, cognitive functioning could
be. Adolescents' brain development is immature because the frontal lobe, the part
487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
9 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
10 Id.
" 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
12 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
" Id. at 318-19.
14 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 21-23.
'" Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
996-1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of the brain responsible for reasoning, impulse control, cost-benefit calculations,
and good judgment, is not fully developed. 16 This means that adolescents are
inherently more prone to risk-taking behavior and less capable of governing
impulses than adults. The ability of adolescents to make cost-benefit calculations,
as compared to adults, is deficient.' 7 Additionally, their susceptibility to peer
pressure is greater because of this impaired judgment. 8 Moreover, adolescents are
more volatile than adults, experiencing more extreme emotions that are not as
regulated as they are in adults.' 9
These studies were presented to the Court as evidence that adolescents are
biologically different.20 The logical argument to the Court based on the biological
difference evidence was as follows: If adolescents' cognitive functioning is
significantly less developed, then so is their level of understanding of their actions.
In short, adolescents have a reduced capacity. In turn, as agents with a reduced
capacity, adolescents are inherently less blameworthy than adults who commit the
same crimes. If adolescents are less culpable, then the ultimate punishment-the
death penalty-is disproportionate.
There were links in the jurisprudence about retribution we identified as
malleable points of entry for the scientific evidence.2' In Atkins, the Court
identified factors which measure culpability. The Court stated:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills
such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became
manifest before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the
difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.
Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to
engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated
plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.
Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions,
but they do diminish their personal culpability.22
16 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 16.
17 Id. at 5-6,8.•
'8 Id. at 8-9.
'9 Id. at 8.
20 Id. at 21-22.
2 Id. at 21-22.
22 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (internal citations omitted).
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When researching scientific data, we looked for articles that addressed
adolescents' inability to engage in logical reasoning, the inability to control
impulses, and to be followers rather than leaders.23 Critics of our approach might
argue that we were likening adolescents to persons with mental retardation. Under
this view, our arguments-that adolescents have reduced capacity-could be used
to strip adolescents of their rights in other legal contexts, like abortion. There are
two points to make in response to this critique. First, the constitutional rights
involved in abortion and the death penalty are legally distinct. Abortion is
protected by the 14th Amendment right to privacy, which places limits on the
burdens a state may impose on that right. Conversely, the death penalty is
constitutionally permissible provided its imposition is in keeping with the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Competency,
consent, and rights are the fibers of a rights-based Constitution. Our arguments
about the development stages of the human brain leave these untouched.
Culpability, retribution, and deterrence, meanwhile, are the fibers of the penal
system, and in this context mens rea matters. The second point is that the Roper
science brief's arguments do not strip adolescents of their rights-legally
speaking-nor do they aid anti-death penalty efforts in that-in a strictly legal
sense-there certainly are faults with our approach. The main weakness of our
approach to the science brief was that in asserting an exception, the approach may
have reinforced the rule. To argue that retribution and deterrence are not served by
executing a certain group of offenders (i.e., adolescent offenders) may reinforce
the value and position that retribution and deterrence have in justifying the death
penalty as applied to others not in the excluded subgroup.
In short, a subterranean idea in our brief is that the death penalty is a fair end
and that retribution and deterrence are fair ways of getting there-just not when it
comes to adolescents. But if one is opposed to the death penalty generally (as we
are), such arguments may be counter-productive over time because the argument
theoretically affirms the legitimacy of the death penalty applied to non-excluded
groups. The flip side of this argument is that if there are enough groups exempt
from the death penalty, then legislatures and the Court may come to see capital
punishment itself as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment.
IV. DETERRENCE
Once science shows that the cognitive functioning of adolescents is deficient,
it logically follows that the goals of deterrence will not be met by enforcing capital
sentences against adolescent offenders. 24 We were very careful to distinguish
23 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 8-9, 12-14.
24 Id. at 20-23.
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adolescents, whose cognitive functioning is still maturing, from that of mentally
retarded persons, whose mental age is more or less unchanging.25 We noted that
adolescents exhibit the characteristics of persons with "disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment and control of their impulses."2 6
Our biggest challenge in the brief was determining how to successfully argue
the Court could-and should--draw a line at the age of eighteen. The emerging
research applied to adolescence and "late adolescence"-but none of the data held
that at eighteen years of age, cognitive functioning had fully matured.27 Indeed,
how could the science assert an exact moment in time when the frontal lobe shifts
from being underdeveloped to being fully developed, as it is by definition a
gradual, imprecise process? We did not, however, push the science to support a
point it could not. Rather, we relied on the Court to conclude that eighteen was a
reasonable line to draw between adolescence and adulthood. Indeed, at oral
argument, Justice Ginsburg asked the Missouri State Solicitor, James Layton,
"Why should it be that someone is death-eligible under the age of 18 but not
eligible to be an adult member of the community?, 28 She was likely referring to
the way in which society treats those under eighteen as non-adults by denying
them the right to vote, to serve on juries or in the military, or buy alcohol or
tobacco. Ultimately, the Court took a practical, administrable approach to drawing
a line. As Justice Kennedy noted, "[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude,
the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest."
29
The science brief thus played an important role in the Court's decision in
Roper because it did not quarrel with the accepted bases of the death penalty,
namely retribution and deterrence, nor even with the death penalty itself. Rather
the brief accepted those bases and instead argued that targeting sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders did not serve those goals. We used scientific
research that did not exist at the time of Stanford, and advocated that because
retributory and deterrent goals were not served by applying the death penalty to
juvenile offenders, such application would be unconstitutional. Though the brief
made no robust argument regarding any national consensus, the fact that states
were increasingly outlawing the execution of juveniles was a circumstance that
worked in our favor.3 °
25 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 21-22.
26 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
27 Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 7.
28 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633).
29 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
30 Id. at 564-68; see also id. at 568 ("A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth
Amendment.").
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V. THE ROLE OF THE SCIENCE BRIEF AT ORAL ARGUMENT
In Roper, oral argument focused on the role of the science brief. At least
sixteen out of the twenty-odd questions asked of former Solicitor General Seth
Waxman, who argued on behalf of the minor, Christopher Simmons, related to the
scientific evidence documented in our brief. At argument, Waxman began by
stating that it is well settled that the death penalty should not apply to a certain
group of juvenile offenders, but that the question was "where our society's
evolving standards of decency now draw that line.' 3' Waxman asserted that the
scientific evidence suggesting that adolescent brains were undeveloped did not
exist in 1989, when the court decided Stanford. Chief Justice Rehnquist
questioned the degree to which the Court could consider the role of the scientific
evidence, given that it was not introduced at trial. Rehnquist quipped, "I would
think if you want to rely on evidence like that, it ought to be introduced at trial and
subject to cross examination rather than just put in amicus briefs. ' 32 Waxman
made two points to rebut this issue. First, he pointed out that the research findings
were made after Simmons' 1997 trial. Second, he noted that the question of
whether executing juveniles is constitutional was not an issue in Simmons' trial.
Instead the issue at trial was a state law and what the jury was told was the law.
Justice Kennedy specifically asked Waxman to comment on the scientific
evidence. Rather than becoming distracted by and mired in issues of competency,
Waxman rightly focused on moral culpability as derived from the cognitive
difference and deficiency of the adolescent mind. Thus, what the brief
emphasized, and what Waxman reasserted, was the similarities in cognitive
development between adolescents and mentally retarded offenders as related to
moral culpability. This is legally-and factually--distinct from the notion of
cognitive development as it relates to the ability to make a competent decision.
Thus, Waxman argued that juvenile offenders were not deserving of the death
penalty because they lacked the requisite level of culpability so as to justify
retribution or deterrence.
VI. THE DECISION
Writing on behalf of the majority in Roper, Justice Kennedy stated that the
execution of those offenders who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of their
offense was unconstitutional and did not comport with our evolving standards of
decency. Justice Kennedy was acutely aware that a growing number of states were
outlawing such executions, a significant change in the law since the Court decided
Stanford. But the Court's understanding of adolescent brain development was
31 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 18.
32 Id. at 25.
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something that had not been considered fully in Stanford. Justice Kennedy heavily
quoted the evidence presented in the science brief:
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, "[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often
than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions." 3
He then continued:
It has been noted that "adolescents are overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior." Arnett, Reckless Behavior
in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental
Review 339 (1992). In recognition of the comparative immaturity and
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18
years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental
consent. (citation omitted).
The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure . . . . This is explained in part by the prevailing
circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment. See Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty
by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist
1009, 1014 (2003) (hereinafter Steinberg & Scott) ("[A]s legal minors,
[juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from
a criminogenic setting").
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed. See generally E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and
Crisis (1968). 34
The science brief figured prominently in the panoply of arguments available
to Justice Kennedy when writing the Court's opinion. In his assessment of
whether retribution was served by executing juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the importance of culpability and proportionality. Thus, Roper also
reinforces the tendency in death penalty law to focus almost exclusively on
assessing culpability as an initial matter, with deterrence as a secondary concern to
make application of culpability administrable.
33 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
34 Id. at 569-70.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since the mid-1970s, death penalty jurisprudence has largely focused on the
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment rather than on the legitimacy of the
death penalty itself. For better or worse, Roper v. Simmons and the science brief
were embedded in, and contributed to, that legacy. In arguing for yet another
exception, one could argue we merely reinforced the legitimacy of the death
penalty itself. Given that exceptions tend to reinforce the rule from which they are
exempt, our strategy raises the question of whether litigating exceptions is the best
approach if eliminating the death penalty is the ultimate goal. Lawyers often
straddle the line between a detached intellectualism and an engaged activism to
change society for the better with law as our principal tool. Whether Roper-and
the strategies employed therein-was for better or worse is something that only
time-and future litigation efforts-will reveal.

